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On September 17, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an emergency 
order banning the shorting of 797 financial stocks. This paper studies the impact of the short 
selling ban on the credit derivatives market by investigating credit default swap (CDS) prices 
during the period that the ban was in effect. The hypothesis is proposed that the short selling ban 
on 797 financial stocks led market participants to enter CDS contracts to reflect positions that the 
participants had formerly entered through short sales, thus driving up CDS rates.  Analysis 
compares the CDS prices of firms protected by the ban to the CDS prices of similar firms in the 
S&P 500 not covered by the ban.  Tests are also conducted using metrics from the bond and 
equities markets to determine if the results from the CDS market are unique to the CDS space.  A 
linear regression technique is used to test the significance of the ban on CDS prices.  The study 
results indicate that the CDS prices of firms covered by the short selling restrictions experienced 
significant dislocations during the period of the ban.      
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 On September 17, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an 
emergency order (release no. 34-58592) immediately banning the shorting of 797 financial 
stocks.1  In a public release announcement, the SEC argued that the measure was designed in 
response to the crisis of confidence that was plaguing financial markets and contributing to steep 
declines in the prices of securities related to the financial and housing sectors.  Financial 
regulators feared that the practice of short selling placed excessive pressures on firms and caused 
artificial fluctuations in the securities markets.  Regulators had been given ample reason to worry 
about the health of the financial industry as only two days prior the historic investment bank 
Lehman Brothers was forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  Repercussions from 
Lehman’s failure were widely and immediately felt as the Reserve Primary Fund, a multibillion 
dollar money market fund, “broke the buck” on September 16 and the net value of shares in the 
fund fell below the standard one dollar mark.  Adding to the worsening financial dilemma was a 
request to the New York Federal Reserve by American International Group (AIG) for a $65 
billion dollar bailout to pay off prior obligations.  To protect public interests and prevent severe 
disruptions in the securities markets, the SEC declared that the short selling ban would remain in 
effect until 11:59 PM EST on October 2, 2008, with the possibility of a 30-day extension.  
Market-makers that sold short to hedge positions and engage in market-making activity were 
excluded from the ban.   
                                                
1 The practice of short selling involves the selling of a security that the seller does not own.  This 
can be done by borrowing a security and immediately selling it, with the assumption that the 
security can be purchased at a later date for delivery to the lender.  
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 Within a week of the restrictions being instituted, additional financial stocks were added 
to the banned list.  This included 32 stocks on September 22 and 44 stocks on September 23.  It 
appears that the addition of these firms to the banned list came as a result of quick lobbying on 
the part of the firms involved, along with the speed and manner at which the original list was 
compiled.  Critics complained that the original list was so haphazardly compiled that the SEC 
emergency order document listed multiple firms twice and several stock ticker symbols were 
outdated.  When the ban formally expired on October 2, 2008, the SEC declared that the ban 
would be extended to the earlier of two dates: October 17, 2008, or three business days following 
the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang 2008).  After President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on October 3, the SEC 
announced that the ban would expire at 11:59 PM EST on October 8, 2008.   
 Due to the recentness of the short selling ban, literature on its effects has thus far been 
limited.  Work by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) suggests that the ban was linked to an 
initial sharp increase in share prices for those securities covered by the ban.  However, studies 
have not yet been published concerning the effects of the ban on CDS premiums.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that market participants, including speculators, entered into new CDS 
contracts to hedge positions formally covered by short sales, but detailed analysis has not yet 
been completed.  
 As defined by Claes and De Ceuster (2008), a credit default swap is a bilateral contract in 
which the notional amount of a bond is insured against specified credit events by a protection 
seller in exchange for a fixed fee (the CDS premium) that is paid periodically by a protection 
buyer.  Credit default swaps are considered derivative financial instruments and are thus traded 
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through over-the-counter transactions instead of central exchanges.  In an interview with Charlie 
Rose on April 12, 2010, famed short seller and hedge fund manager Jim Chanos asserted that the 
primary buyers in the CDS markets during the Fall of 2008 were large banking organizations.  
However, hedge funds were also widely expected to be active participants in the single name 
CDS markets.  When negotiating contracts, the buyer and seller of a CDS contract individually 
agree on the legal details of each transaction and relatively standard agreements often take one or 
two days to complete.  Payments by the protection buyer are usually made quarterly and are thus 
in the amount of one-fourth of the total CDS premium.  In the case of a credit event, the 
protection buyer delivers the underlying bond to the protection seller who must then pay the 
protection buyer either the notional amount of the bond or the difference between the current 
bond price and notional value.  According to Claes and De Cuester (2008), the most common 
credit events that trigger settlement of a CDS contract include bankruptcy of the underlying bond 
issuer, failure to pay interest payments by the issuer, or the restructuring of debt contracts by the 
issuer.  Contracts can often be settled at an earlier time for an amount equal to the difference 
between the current market CDS price and the price at which the contract was originally entered.  
Through this process, a party can potentially enter into a speculative agreement with the purpose 
of settling the contract if the market price of the CDS agreement reaches a certain threshold.    
 Given that market participants often hedge their positions through the execution of short 
sales, a ban on the practice of short selling for all non market-makers could lead market 
participants to pursue other methods of entering short positions against a firm.  Purchasing credit 
default protection is one method of either hedging existing positions or placing speculative bets 
since CDS premia are highly inversely correlated to stock prices.  Thus, market participants may 
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have pushed up CDS premiums by driving up demand for new agreements as a substitute for 
shorting equities.   
 This paper attempts to study the impact of the short selling ban on the credit derivatives 
market by investigating CDS prices during the period that the ban was in effect. The Literature 
Review section outlines existing literature on CDS price modeling and the effects of the SEC ban 
on the equities market.  The Study Design section outlines the methodologies used to test for 
disturbances in the CDS market during the period that the ban was in place.  Potential 
disturbances in the CDS market are then compared to potential dislocations in other fluid 
security markets. 
 Studying the effects of the short sale ban on the credit derivatives market provides 
valuable insight to any policy maker considering a future ban of the practice.  Although some 
initial work has been released analyzing the effects of the short selling ban on securities markets, 
little research has been done on the impacts to derivatives markets.  The International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, the largest global trade association in the derivates industry, estimates 
the size of the credit default swap market on single bond references to have been $38.6 trillion at 
the end of 2008. Given the extensive volume of the credit default swap market and the current 
absence of a central exchange for the derivatives, it is important to consider the possible effects 
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 Due to the relative recency of the SEC short selling ban, academic literature concerning 
the impacts of the ban on the CDS market has not yet been published.  However, research has 
been conducted concerning the impact of the ban on stock prices, the rate of stock short sales, 
and equity market liquidity.  Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) discover that the shorting ban is 
linked with a large increase in share prices for the covered stocks, and shorting activity fell by 
about 85% while the ban was in effect.  Stocks affected by the ban also suffered from higher 
spreads and intraday volatility. 
 Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) analyze impacts on share prices through the 
computation of cumulative raw returns for the S&P 500 index, the stocks on the SEC’s original 
shorting ban list, and the 1,066 NYSE stocks that were not covered by the ban. Abnormal daily 
returns of the securities covered by ban are determined by subtracting the return on the S&P 500 
index.  This same methodology of analyzing raw returns can be used to compute price increases 
in the CDS market during the period of the ban.  Such a test serves as a preliminary indicator of 
CDS price disruptions due to short selling restrictions.   
 Literature on the determinants of credit default swap prices attempts to explain the 
spreads using a wide variety of pricing variables.  Generally, pricing models take into account 
sources of price determinants that can be separated into two distinct categories: credit pricing 
factors and macroeconomic factors.  The effects of the equity shorting ban can be analyzed in the 
CDS space by comparing credit-pricing factors to CDS premiums and by transforming the short 
selling ban into a dummy variable that is subsequently inserted into macroeconomic pricing 
regressions. 
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 Works by Amato (2005) find that CDS spreads are influenced by risk aversion factors 
that can be measured from macroeconomic and technical market measures.  Amato’s findings 
drive research by Sougné, Heuchenne, and Hübner (2008) that address the relationship between 
CDS spreads and a set of macroeconomic factors during the period 2002-2005. 
 In order to test Amato’s findings, Sougné, Heuchenne, and Hübner analyze the influence 
of macroeconomic variables on a cross-section of CDS spreads with the prediction that variables 
reflecting market uncertainty will be correlated with higher CDS prices.  The time-varying 
exposures of CDS spreads are modeled to macroeconomic factors using a Kalman filter 
procedure.  The procedure involves starting with a completely restricted model containing only 
an intercept, and adding variables one by one, including any uncorrelated variables that increased 
r-squared in an important way.  Factors considered in the test include credit ratings, interest rates, 
time to maturity, stock prices, leverage, and index returns.  Many of these same factors can be 
used in a similar process to model CDS prices before and during the SEC ban.  If a dummy 
variable that represents the days that the SEC ban was in effect were to be significant in the 
pricing equation, this would indicate that the ban effected CDS prices.    
 Abid and Naifar (2006) conduct similar studies in an attempt to explain the determinants 
of CDS spreads using a variety of credit pricing variables. A regression technique is used by 
Abid and Naifar to show the relationship between factors influencing default risk and CDS 
prices.  All equations are estimated as simple linear regressions.  The White test is used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.  After analyzing multiple factors, Abut and Naifar conclude that 
credit rating is the most important variable in determining credit default swap spreads.  Factors 
such as maturity, riskless interest rate, slope of the yield curve, and volatility of equity are also 
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statistically significant in determining spreads.  Market conditions were extremely volatile during 
the period of the SEC ban and equity volatility levels may also explain a sizeable portion of CDS 
price increases.  A negative correlation is found between the risk-free interest rate and CDS 
premiums, implying that the probability of default increases when the risk-free interest rate 
increases.  
 Byström (2008) moves away from the debt market to explain CDS price determinants 
and instead focuses on the correlation between CDS spreads and the equities market.  Earlier 
works by Longstaff, Norden, and Weber (2003) also focus on the link between the single name 
CDS spread changes and stock returns. Byström’s tests frame a portion of this paper’s study in 
comparing the relationship between CDS prices and equity prices during the period that the ban 
was enforced. Byström also finds highly significant correlations between CDS spread levels and 
stock volatilities.  These conclusions agree with those by Abid and Naifar (2006) arguing of the 
significance of volatility levels in determining CDS prices and reinforce the importance of 
including volatility in any CDS pricing equation. Tests to determine the speed at which firm-
specific information is incorporated in different markets show that information flows fastest to 
the CDS market.  Stock returns lagged by one day are almost as significantly correlated with 
current CDS spreads as current stock returns.  This finding is important to studies focusing on 
the SEC ban since the ban was instituted on a specific day with little advanced notice.  Thus, data 
at the beginning of the SEC ban should also reflect a situation where information is incorporated 
in the CDS market at the same time, or prior to, the equities market.        
 
Study Design  
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 Data on CDS, equity prices, and bond prices are gathered from Bloomberg LP. 
Microeconomic data including CPI, stock market indexes, and the risk-free rate are also all 
gathered from Bloomberg.  Equity short interest data and short percent of float data are taken 
from Short Squeeze, a financial data provider that supplies historic biweekly short interest 
metrics.  Daily CDS prices on underlying five-year bonds are collected from March 3, 2008, to 
October 24, 2008.  This timeframe provides a range of data before, during, and after the short 
selling ban.  Data are collected on 30 CDS entities whose corresponding equities were covered 
by the shorting ban, as well as 60 entities with corresponding equities in the S&P 500 that were 
not covered by the ban.2  To be included in the sample, the CDS entities must have listed daily 
prices on Bloomberg during at least 80 percent of the sample period.  Daily CDS prices are 
generated by Bloomberg from submissions by partner banks and represent end-of-day composite 
prices.  If the CDS prices supplied by the partner banks exhibit a high degree of variance on a 
specific day, Bloomberg does not publish a composite price for that day.  Thirty firms on the 
SEC banned list had available CDS prices on 80 percent of the days, while 60 firms in the S&P 
500 not included on the banned list had available prices.  CDS price indices in this study are 
created by taking the weighted average end-of-day prices for the two groups of CDS contracts: 
contracts whose corresponding equities were covered by the shorting ban (labeled “Banned CDS 
Index”) and contracts whose corresponding equities were not covered (labeled “S&P 60 CDS 
Index”).  Taking the differences between the “Banned CDS Index” and “S&P 60 CDS Index” 
generates a final index, labeled “Abnormal CDS Spread”.  Such an index indicates the presence 
                                                
2 See Appendices I and II for a listing of firms included in the study.  
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of pricing abnormalities that impact the CDS prices of firms included in the SEC ban.   The 
“Abnormal CDS Spread” is used on the left side of the regression equation and pricing factors 
such as the three-month libor rate are regressed against it.        
 Corresponding equity and bond indices are created using the same methodology as 
applied to the CDS indices.  An equity index, labeled “Banned Equity Index” is composed of the 
equity prices of the same 30 firms covered by the ban, while an index labeled “S&P 60 Equity 
Index” is composed of the equity prices of the same 60 firms composing the “S&P 60 CDS 
Index”.  An index titled “Abnormal Equity Spread” measures the differences between the two 
indices. Similarly, indices labeled “Banned Bond Index”, “S&P 60 Bond Index”, and “Abnormal 
Bond Spread” are also created using bond price data of bonds with like maturities.  This process 
ensures consistency when comparing CDS to equity and bond prices and allows for comparisons 
across the three markets.   
 Daily prices are only included in the CDS, equity, and bond indices if at least two thirds 
of the entities that make up the index report prices for that day.  For example, if the CDS prices 
of only 15 of the 30 entities covered by the ban were available on a given day, the CDS index 
would not include a price for that day. 
 In addition to the aforementioned indices, all tests are also conducted using similar 
indices composed of firms whose prices meet all of the criteria listed above but are adjusted to 
reflect the pricing irregularities during the time of Lehman Brothers failure.  Correlation tests are 
run comparing CDS prices of the specific firms included in the “Banned CDS Index” and “S&P 
60 CDS Index” to the CDS prices of Bear Stearns from March 3, 2008 to March 14, 2008.  The 
period used in the correlation tests is important due to the Federal Reserve’s decision to approve 
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a financing agreement on March 14, 2008 that facilitated the purchase of Bear Stearns by 
JPMorgan Chase.  During the two weeks prior to the purchase of Bear Stearns, market 
uncertainty surrounding Bear Stearns’ financial health and the unknown repercussions that 
would follow the failure of a major financial institution drove up CDS prices across market 
sectors.  A similar situation occurred during the weeks leading up to September 15, 2008 when 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
Unfortunately, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers only two days prior to the start of the SEC 
short selling ban likely had an important impact on CDS prices during the sample period and 
should be taken into account when analyzing the impact of the ban on CDS prices.  By 
conducting correlation tests comparing CDS prices during the two weeks prior to the acquisition 
of Bear Stearns, new indices can be created composed of firms whose CDS prices were nearly 
equally effected by the potential failure of Bear Stearns.  Such indices would more likely be 
similarly affected by the actual failure of Lehman Brothers since both Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns were large investment banks with financial deals interconnected with other Wall Street 
firms. Thus, the new abnormal delta of the indices correlated to the CDS prices of Bear Stearns 
should be lower than the original “Abnormal CDS Spread”.  The new indices reflecting firms 
whose CDS prices were similarly correlated to the CDS prices of Bear Stearns are labeled 
“Banned CDS Index Correlated” and “S&P 60 CDS Index Correlated”. 3  Twenty firms are 
included in each of the two indices.  The index labeled “Abnormal CDS Spread Correlated” 
measures the differences between the two indices. Firms included in the “Banned CDS Index 
Correlated” group have an average correlation of 0.85 to the CDS prices of Bear Stearns, while 
                                                
3 See Appendices I and II for lists of the firms included in the indices. 
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the firms included in the “S&P 60 CDS Index Correlated” group have an average correlation of 
0.80 to the CDS prices of Bear Stearns.  
 Testing procedures for this paper involve determining the average percentage change, or 
delta, in CDS premiums during the period that the ban was in place.  Higher CDS price increases 
for firms covered by the ban compared to firms not covered could suggest pricing irregularities.  
This same procedure is conducted using equity and bond prices in an attempt to replicate the 
results of Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008).  Studying the effects of the ban on CDS prices, 
equity prices, and bond prices allows for a comparison of pricing differentials across three 
markets.  If the price spreads between banned and non-banned entities are small in the equities 
and bond markets it is expected that the price spreads should also be small in the CDS market. 
 In addition to comparing the spreads between the Banned CDS indices and S&P CDS 
indices, testing procedures also seek to discover pricing discontinuity between specific firms 
within the Banned CDS indices.  Equity short interest data are used to establish two indices 
composed of firms in the “Banned CDS Index Correlated” universe.  The first index is composed 
of firms whose equity shares were shorted in the top 50 percentile of volume during the two 
weeks prior to the SEC ban.  The second index is composed of firms whose equity shares were 
shorted in the bottom 50 percentile of volume.  These indices are labeled “Top 50 Percentile 
Shorted by Volume” and “Bottom 50 Percentile Shorted by Volume” respectively.  Similarly, 
two other indices are constructed to compare discontinuity within the “Banned CDS Index 
Correlated” universe.  The indices are ordered by firms’ short percent of float data and organized 
in the same fashion as the short volume indices.  Short percent of float metrics represent the 
portion of a firm’s shares sold short in comparison to the trading volume of the firm’s shares that 
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took place during the time period.  Firms whose equity shares were sold short in higher ratios 
during the two weeks prior to the SEC ban would be more likely to have higher dislocations in 
their corresponding CDS prices following the ban.  Through the process of ordering banned 
firms by their number and ratio of shares sold short prior to the SEC ban it is possible to 
determine if discontinuity existed within the banned control group.  
 Data are also directly compared between corresponding equity, bond, and CDS prices in 
the same method used by Byström (2008).  Correlation tests are run to determine the strength of 
the relationship between equity, bond, and CDS prices during the period of the ban.  Substantial 
defections from the inverse relationship between corresponding equity and CDS prices or 
corresponding bond and CDS prices during the period of the ban would suggest the existence of 
market disturbances.  
 A linear regression technique based on the approach taken by Abid and Naifar (2006) is 
used to show the relationship between CDS prices and external factors such as the short selling 
ban.  Equations are estimated as simple linear regressions and the White test is used to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.  A dummy variable representing the days that the ban was in effect is used to 
test if the ban was a significant variable in CDS prices.  Other variables including the three-
month libor rate, the VIX volatility index, the S&P 500 index, and the price of gold, are all 
regressed against CDS price spreads to compare significance levels.  The three-month libor rate 
is representative of the risk-free interest rate and any increase in CDS prices could be explained 
by a corresponding increase in the overall rate of risk.  Gold is another barometer of risk due to 
its tendency to rise in value during periods of financial turmoil.  The S&P 500 index is a proxy 
for stock prices and should act in an inverse manner to CDS prices.  Finally, the VIX volatility 
May 19, 2010 2008 SEC SHORT SELLING BAN: 






index should be negatively related to CDS prices due to the theory that insurance costs increase 
in times of financial uncertainty.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to include credit ratings as a 
variable in the regression due to the fact that rating agencies did not issue an important number 




 Analysis of the CDS price indices indicates that the CDS prices of entities covered by the 
SEC ban rose at a higher rate during the period of the ban than entities not covered.4  Prior to the 
ban, the CDS prices of covered entities tracked the prices of the S&P 60 Index with less then a 
seven percent daily differential from August 19, 2008 to September 8, 2008.  The “Abnormal 
CDS Spread” reveals that the sharp increases in price of banned entities began to appear several 
days before the implementation of the ban.5  It is likely that the initial rise in CDS prices of 
banned entities was a result of Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, as 
investors feared that other financial firms would also be vulnerable to the stresses that faced 
Lehman.  In addition to the failure of Lehman Brothers, money market funds were experiencing 
huge outflows after the inventor of money market funds revealed that the net value of shares in 
his flagship fund, the Reserve Primary Fund, had fallen below one dollar.  Despite these historic 
moments of financial distress, the “Abnormal CDS Spread” continued to rise another 50 
percentage points a week following Lehman’s bankruptcy, suggesting that other factors 
influenced the rise in CDS prices for firms protected by the SEC ban.  
                                                
4 See Appendix IV for a chart comparing the “Banned CDS Index” and “S&P 60 CDS Index”. 
5 See Appendix V for a chart depicting the “Abnormal CDS Spread”. 
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 The effect of Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy on CDS prices can be partly determined 
through the analysis of the “Abnormal CDS Correlated Spread”.  As previously described, the 
CDS correlated indices are composed of firms that were similarly affected by the potential 
failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008.  A chart of the “Abnormal CDS Correlated Spread” 
demonstrates a pricing pattern nearly identical to the “Abnormal CDS Spread” chart suggesting 
that CDS pricing irregularities still existed in the CDS market even when accounting for such 
shocks as Lehman Brothers’ failure.6  However, a comparison between the “Abnormal CDS 
Spread” and “Abnormal CDS Correlated Spread” demonstrate that spreads were indeed less 
extreme during market shocks for firms that were price correlated during Bear Stearns’ bailout.     
 At the peak of the price differentials the “Abnormal CDS Spread” reached nearly 130 
percent, indicating that entities covered by the securities ban had corresponding CDS prices 130 
percent higher than those of entities not covered by the ban.  In comparison, the price 
differentials of the “Abnormal CDS Correlated Spread” reached 112 percent, a difference that 
potentially accounts for some of the impact of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.  Particularly 
interesting is the fact that the “Abnormal CDS Spread” fell more then 40 percent within three 
days of the ban’s end. Due to the over-the-counter nature of the CDS market, CDS trades are not 
performed over an exchange and instead often take multiple days to complete.  It is likely that 
the CDS market experienced a large sell-off that lasted up to a week after the removal of the ban.  
The drive towards pricing normalcy was so sudden that by October 13, the CDS prices of 
covered entities actually reached levels below the average price of non-covered entities.  Of 
equal interest is the 60 percent decline in the “Abnormal CDS Spread” over the course of the 
                                                
6 See Appendix VI for a chart depicting the “Abnormal CDS Correlated Spread”. 
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three days leading up to October 2.  The initial announcement of the SEC ban stipulated that the 
ban would last until October 2 with the possibility of an extension.  Due to the fact that the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was not passed and signed until October 3, it 
seems that the best explanations for the significant drop in the “Abnormal CDS Spread” were 
market expectations that the ban would be lifted.  The increase in the “Abnormal CDS Spread” 
after the implementation of the ban, coupled with the maintenance of this spread during its 
enforcement, both indicate that the equity ban had some influence on the CDS market.  Further 
evidence showing that the “Abnormal CDS Spread” rapidly diminished upon the potential and 
then actual removal of the ban offers even greater support for this hypothesis. 
 Discontinuity tests organized by equity short sales data indicate that firms whose shares 
were sold short in higher concentrations prior to the SEC ban incurred greater increases in their 
CDS prices during the period of the ban.  In a sample consisting of the firms in the “Ban CDS 
Index Correlated”, firms that were previously sold short in higher concentrations had average 
CDS price increases nearly 100 percent higher than firms not sold short prior to the ban.  Similar 
results are produced when either conducting the tests based on short sales volume data or using 
short sales percent of float data.  Creating distinct CDS indices based on short sales percent of 
float data may be a more useful approach due to the high variance in the shares outstanding of 
the different firms.  For example, the firm JPMorgan Chase may have experienced a high volume 
of short sales due to the large number of shares outstanding in the company.  However, this same 
firm could have exhibited a relatively low short sales percent of float metric for the very same 
reason of having a high number of shares outstanding.  Despite the differences between the short 
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sales volume and short sales percent of float metrics, the use of either metric in creating CDS 
indices generates output with similar trends. 
 Five days prior to the enactment of the SEC ban, CDS prices of firms that would later be 
covered by the ban with high short sales volumes began to rise drastically higher than those of 
firms with low short sales volumes.7  Although this initially appears intuitive, the scale of the 
CDS pricing spreads marks the period as an important one.  During the one month timeframe 
prior to September 10, 2008, CDS price deltas between firms that were sold short in high 
proportion to their trading flow, compared to those that were not, fluctuated within a five percent 
band.8  By September 18, 2008, the spread in deltas between the two groups reached over 90 
percent.  Thus, heavily shorted firms covered by the SEC ban experienced CDS price increases 
over 90 percent higher than firms covered by the ban with low short sale ratios.  Although the 
spread in deltas between the two groups fluctuated considerably during the period of the SEC 
ban, the most telling impact of the ban on CDS prices can be seen in the three days following the 
lifting of the ban.  Only three days after the passing of the ban, the spread in deltas of the two 
indices fell over 70 percent from highs reached on September 30, 2008.  The timing of such a 
steep decline strongly suggests that the delta spreads were influenced by the enforcement of the 
short selling ban.  With the withdrawal of the short selling ban market participants were free to 
once again enter equity short selling positions and the demand for alternative derivative 
investments to achieve the same financial positions fell. 
                                                
7 See Appendix VII for a chart depicting the “Discontinuity Test Spread by Shorting Volume”. 
8 See Appendix VIII for a chart depicting the “Discontinuity Test Spread by Shorting Ratio of 
Total Trading Float”. 
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 The high price spread existent in the CDS market between the “Ban CDS Index” and 
“S&P 60 Index”, or between the subgroups of the banned entities, is not found in the 
corresponding equities market.  The “Abnormal Equities Spread” indicates that the equity prices 
of firms covered by the ban track within five percentage points of the equity prices of the “S&P 
60 Index” firms during the entirety of the ban.9  An absence of the major pricing spreads existent 
in the CDS market suggests that arbitrage strategies were utilized in the CDS market in order to 
bypass the short selling ban in the securities market. 
 During the period of the SEC short selling ban, the bond market also experienced sharp 
dislocations similar to the CDS market.  Average bond prices for firms included in the “Ban 
Bond Correlated Index” fell over ten percent more than bond prices in the “S&P Bond 
Correlated Index” within two days of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing.10  These differences 
soon converged after the curtailing of the SEC short selling ban and within three days of the 
ban’s dismissal the “Abnormal Bond Correlated Spread” fell below five percent.  Overall, the 
bond price market behaved in a very similar manner to the CDS market following the SEC ban 
and such behavior suggests that the CDS market may not have been the only method for 
financial market participants to enter short positions that achieved ends similar to the practice of 
shorting equities.     
   Correlation analysis testing the relationship between equity prices and CDS prices 
tentatively suggests that the shorting ban had some effect in causing a disconnect between the 
two markets. Earlier work by Byström (2008) demonstrates that CDS prices and their 
corresponding equity prices are nearly perfectly negatively correlated.  In the period from August 
                                                
9 See Appendix III for a chart depicting the “Banned Equity Index” and “S&P 60 Equity Index”. 
10 See Appendix IX for a chart depicting the “Abnormal Bond Spread Correlated”. 
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18, 2008 to October 24, 2008, the equity and CDS price indices of firms in the “S&P 60 Index” 
have a clearly significant negative correlation of -0.97.  The same correlation test is also 
significant at the 95 percent level when the firms covered by the SEC ban are substituted and 
data is used from August 18, 2008 to October 24, 2008.  Although both correlations are 
statistically significant, the correlation between the equity and CDS prices of the firms in the 
“S&P 60 Index” is stronger than the relationship between the corresponding equity and CDS 
prices of the firms in the “Ban CDS Index”.11  When similar correlation tests are applied that 
only include the period when the ban was in affect, the equity and CDS price correlation of the 
covered firms is even weaker.  However, the correlation is still significant at the 95 percent level. 
 Regressing pricing variables against the “Abnormal CDS Spread” offers further support 
for the theory that the SEC short selling ban caused dislocations in the CDS market.  The dummy 
variable BAN, representing the period that the ban was enforced, is significant at the 95 percent 
level when used to explain the “Abnormal CDS Spread”.  Other variables significant at the 95 
percent level include the S&P 500 Index and the price of gold.12  The final pricing formula is 
represented by the equation:        
 
Abnormal CDS Spread = BAN(x) +  SP(x) + GOLD(x) + e  
 
The statistical significance of the BAN dummy variable is an important indication that the SEC 
ban played a role in the increase of CDS prices during its enforcement.  Furthermore, the 
                                                
11 See Appendix X for a table containing correlation values. 
12 See Appendix XI for a table listing the regression values.  Appendix XII contains the variable   
descriptive statistics. 
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coefficient of the BAN dummy variable is over 29, meaning that the SEC ban forced the CDS 
prices of the covered entities 29 percent higher than their counterparts not included in the ban 
group.  The S&P 500 Index has a negative coefficient of -0.085, indicating that CDS prices 
decrease almost 0.1 percent for every point increase in the S&P 500.  Gold has a coefficient of 
0.18, indicating CDS prices increase nearly 0.2 percent for every dollar increase in the price of 
an ounce of gold.  A volatility measure represented by the VIX index was not significant, nor 
was the riskless rate represented by the three-month libor rate.    
 The r-squared value of the explanatory equation is 0.482, suggesting that the equation 
only weakly describes the “Abnormal CDS Spread”.  This test is limited by the weak explanatory 
power of the “Abnormal CDS Spread” equation, which may partly be attributed to the multitude 
of events that occurred during the two-week period that the ban was enforced.  Further limiting 
the explanatory power is the fact that the “Abnormal CDS Spread” is generated by taking the 
difference between the “Ban CDS Index” and the “S&P 60 CDS Index”.  Therefore, variables in 
the “Abnormal CDS Spread” regression are used to explain a delta in two CDS indices, rather 
than simply the prices of one index.  It is interesting to note that neither a volatility index nor a 
risk index were significant variables in increasing the pricing spreads.  This could indicate that 
both volatility and a rise in the risk-free rate had equal or similar impacts on the prices of both 
the banned entities and S&P entities.  
 A major problem facing this study remains in determining what pricing irregularities can 
be isolated to the SEC ban and what irregularities should be attributed to other independent 
market events.  In particular, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers only days before the enactment 
of the short selling ban likely had a substantial effect on the CDS prices of financial institutions.  
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It remains unclear how long this catalyst impacted the CDS market of financial firms.  Future 
research should attempt to further quantify the impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy on the CDS 




 Statistical tests demonstrate that the CDS prices of firms covered by the SEC short selling 
ban experienced significant pressures during the period that the ban was enforced.  Moreover, the 
ban had a greater effect on the CDS prices of protected firms that were previously sold short in 
high volumes than on protected firms that were not previously sold short in high volumes.  The 
existence of this discontinuity within the group of firms protected by the ban strengthens the 
study results and suggests that such a short selling ban could be particularly detrimental to the 
CDS prices of firms that the SEC was most concerned in protecting.   Although these results may 
be partially influenced by other market events that occurred during the same time frame, the 
clear differences in behavior between the equities and CDS markets, and bond and CDS markets 
indicate that participants likely engaged in active arbitrage within the CDS market.  
Compounding the disturbing nature of this claim is the assertion by Chanos that the main buyers 
of such CDS contracts at the time were the same firms whose equity shares were specifically 
protected by the ban.  The results of the study are also strengthened by the inclusion of firms in 
the price indices that were nearly equally effected by an earlier market shock similar to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers.  While the share prices of equities covered by the ban maintained a 
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close relationship to the prices of other similar S&P firms, the CDS prices of firms covered by 
the ban varied wildly from their counterparts.   
 As the CDS prices of entities covered by the ban varied from their counterparts, so too 
did the bond prices of entities covered by the ban vary with respect to their counterparts.  This 
evidence suggests that the CDS market was not alone in experiencing dislocations during the 
period of the SEC ban.  Due to the short time frame that the ban was enforced, it is difficult to 
evaluate financial metrics of firms outside of the equity, bond, and CDS markets.  Thus, it 
remains inconclusive if the inconsistencies between the equity, CDS, and bond markets are due 
only to the ban’s positive effect of shielding the equities market from short sellers, or if the ban 
instead distorted the bond and CDS spaces by driving short sellers to these markets.  The answer 
to this question of causality may be a combination of these forces but the data seem to 
overwhelming indicate that it was the bond and CDS spaces that were more intensely effected by 
the ban.  Perhaps most telling is the fact that the CDS prices of firms covered by the ban returned 
to levels similar to those priced during the first week of September within only three days of the 
ban’s repeal.  The clear return to normalcy only days after the lifting of the ban, along with the 
sudden drop in the “Abnormal CDS Spread” on October 2 indicates that active arbitration 
occurred in the CDS markets.  Even the passage and signing of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act on October 3 failed to have an impact as significant on the “Abnormal CDS 
Spread” as did the potential lifting of the ban on October 2. 
 When making future decisions whether to implement such a ban, the SEC should not 
discount evidence that the short selling ban clearly caused disruptions to the CDS market.  The 
CDS market represents nearly a $40 trillion market and substantial price swings can have 
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important impacts on bondholders, CDS underwriters, and other markets in general.  Investors 
are increasingly viewing CDS prices as market indicators of a firm’s financial health.  Price 
swings indicate market uncertainty and can encourage so called “bank runs” that perpetuate 
crises.  The opaque nature of the over-the-counter derivatives market should also be noted, as 
many of the CDS participants are likely to be closely interconnected.  As exemplified by the 
multiple bailouts of AIG, the potential failure of a single large CDS counterparty could have a 
tremendous negative impact on the entire world economy.  In order to evaluate the SEC short 
selling ban, it is also important to remember the climate of fear that gripped financial markets at 
the time.  Financial regulators, including those at the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve, 
genuinely feared that short sellers could lead the equity prices of financial firms into a downward 
spiral, while profiting from the chaos.  The short selling ban did indeed protect the equity share 
prices of firms, but at the cost of potentially driving up the cost of debt protection and the cost of 
debt itself on these same firms.  Regulators must be cognizant of the potential for arbitrage 
across product spaces.  If a trading ban is to be enacted, such a ban must be enforced across fixed 
income, derivatives, and equity product markets so as to limit the potential for dislocations.  The 
SEC should also closely monitor other potential over-the-counter instruments of arbitrage to 
ensure that the same intended beneficiaries of protection do not actively attempting to abuse the 
protection through the pursuit of speculative strategies. However, as the evidence presented in 
this paper suggests, the SEC should be extremely hesitant to enact future short selling bans and 
should only do so in cases of extreme financial distress. Such hesitancy may already be existent 
within the regulatory community as demonstrated by former Securities and Exchange 
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Commission Chairman Christopher Cox’s remark that “knowing what we know now, I believe 
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Firms included on the SEC short selling ban list that are used in the “Ban CDS Index”: 
 
Ticker Firm Ticker Firm 
ACE ACE LTD ING ING GROUP 
AEG AEGON NV JPM JPMORGAN CHASE 
AET AETNA INC L LOEWS 
AIB ALLIED IRISH BANKS MER MERRILL LYNCH  
AIG AMERICAN INTERNATION GROUP MS MORGAN STANLEY 
AOC AON CORP NMR NOMURA HOLDINGS 
AXA AZA UAP PRUU PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 
BAC BANK OF AMERICA PRUE PRUDENTIAL PLC 
BAR BARCLAYS RBS ROYAL BANK SCOTLAND 
BRK/A BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY SCH CHARLES SCHWAB 
C CITIGROUP INC UBS UBS AG 
CB CHUBB CORP UNM UNUM GROUP 
DB DEUTSCHE BANK WB WACHOVIA 
GS GOLDMAN SACHS WFC WELLS FARGO 










Ticker Firm Ticker Firm 
AEG AEGON NV MER MERRILL LYNCH  
AET AETNA INC MS MORGAN STANLEY 
AIB ALLIED IRISH BANKS NMR NOMURA HOLDINGS 
AIG AMERICAN INTERNATION GROUP PRUE PRUDENTIAL PLC 
AXA AZA UAP SCH CHARLES SCHWAB 
BAC BANK OF AMERICA UBS UBS AG 
C CITIGROUP INC UNM UNUM GROUP 
GS GOLDMAN SACHS WB WACHOVIA 
ING ING GROUP WFC WELLS FARGO 
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Firms listed on the S&P 500 not included on the SEC short selling ban list.  These firms form the 
“S&P 60 Index” used in the study: 
 
Ticker Firm Ticker Firm 
AA ALCOA INC IBM INTL BUSINESS MACH 
AEP AMER ELECTRIC POWER CO JNJ JOHNSON AND JOHNS DC 
ALL ALLSTATE CP KFT KRAFT FOODS INC 
AMGN AMGEN INC LMT LOCKHEED-MARTIN 
AVP AVON PRODUCTS INC MCD MCDONALDS CP 
BA BOEING CO MMM 3M COMPANY 
BAX BAXTER INTL INC MO ALTRIA GROUP INC 
BHI BAKER HUGHES MON MONSANTO COMPANY 
BMY BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB MRK MERK CO INC 
BNI BURLINGTON N SANTE FE NSC NORFOLK SO CP 
CAT CATERPILLAR INC OXY OCCIDENTAL PET 
CL COLGATE PALMOLIVE PEP PEPSICO INC 
COP CONOCOPHILLIPS PFE PFIZER INC 
CPB CAMPBELL SOUP CO PG PROCTOR GAMBLE CO 
CSCO CISCO SYSTEMS, INC RTN RAYTHEON CO 
CVX CHEVRON CORP S SPRINT NXTEL CP 
DD DU PONT SGP SCHERING-PLOUGH 
DELL DELL INC SLE SARA LEE CORP 
DIS WALT DISNEY SO SOUTHERN COMPANY 
DOW DOW CHEMICAL T AT&T INC 
DVN DEVRON ENERGY TGT TARGET CP 
EXC EXELON CORP TWX TIME WARNER INC 
FDX FEDEX UNH UNITED HEALTH GROUP 
GD GENERAL DYNAMICS UPS UNITED PARCEL SVC 
GE GEN ELECTRIC CO UTX UNITED TECH 
HAL HALLIBURTON CO WMB WILLIAMS COS 
HD GOME DEPOT INC WMT WAL MART STORES 
HNZ HEINZ HJ CO WY WEYERHAEUSER CO 
HON HONEYWELL INTL INC WYE WYETH 
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Appendix II (continued) 
 
Firms included in the “S&P 60 Index Correlated” used in the study: 
 
Ticker Firm Ticker Firm 
AEP AMER ELECTRIC POWER CO IBM INTL BUSINESS MACH 
BA BOEING CO KFT KRAFT FOODS INC 
BMY BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB MO ALTRIA GROUP INC 
CAT CATERPILLAR INC MON MONSANTO COMPANY 
DELL DELL INC SGP SCHERING-PLOUGH 
DIS WALT DISNEY T AT&T INC 
DOW DOW CHEMICAL TGT TARGET CP 
FDX FEDEX UTX UNITED TECH 
HNZ HEINZ HJ CO WMT WAL MART STORES 
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Chart depicts the equity price indices created in this study.  The “Ban Equity Index” is a 
composite of the weighted average share prices of thirty entities included in the SEC ban.  The 
“S&P 60 Equity Index” is a composite of the weighted average share prices of sixty entities in 
the S&P 500.  The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that the SEC short selling ban was 
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Chart depicts the “Ban CDS Index” and “S&P 60 CDS Index” created in this study.  The “Ban 
CDS Index” is a composite of the weighted CDS prices of thirty entities included in the SEC 
ban.  The “S&P 60 CDS Index” is a composite of the weighted average CDS prices of sixty 
entities in the S&P 500.  The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that the SEC short selling 
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Chart depicting “Abnormal CDS Spread” represents spreads in the “Ban CDS Index” and “S&P 
60 CDS Index”. The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that the SEC short selling ban was 
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Chart depicting “Abnormal CDS Spread Correlated” represents spreads in the “Ban CDS Index 
Correlated” and “S&P 60 Index Correlated”. The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that 
the SEC short selling ban was implemented and removed. Values are indexed to August 20, 2008 
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Chart depicting “Volume Discontinuity Spread” represents real average price spreads in the “Top 
50 Percentile Shorted by Volume” and “Bottom 50 Percentile Shorted by Volume” groups. The 
two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that the SEC short selling ban was implemented and 
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Chart depicting “Short Percent Discontinuity Spread” represents real average price spreads in the 
“Top 50 Percentile Shorted by Float Percent” and “Bottom 50 Percentile Shorted by Float 
Percent” groups. The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates that the SEC short selling ban was 
implemented and removed.  Values are indexed to August 20, 2008 levels.  Sources: Bloomberg 
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Chart depicting “Abnormal Bond Spread Correlated” represents spreads in the “Ban Bond Index 
Correlated” and “S&P 60 Bond Index Correlated”. The two vertical grey lines indicate the dates 
that the SEC short selling ban was implemented and removed.  Values are indexed to August 20, 
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Table depicts regression results of “Abnormal CDS Spread” equation. 
 
 
Sample: 8/19/2008 10/24/2008    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
BANDUMMY 29.077 8.532 3.408 0.002 
GOLD 0.179 0.099 1.819 0.077 
SPXINDEX -0.085 0.047 -1.820 0.077 
US3M -4.040 11.748 -0.344 0.733 
VIXINDEX -0.608 0.408 -1.492 0.145 
     
R-squared 0.482     Mean dependent var 20.593 20.593 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425     S.D. dependent var 26.215 26.215 
S.E. of regression 19.880     Akaike info criterion 8.931 8.931 
Sum squared resid 14228.260     Schwarz criterion 9.140 9.140 
Log likelihood -178.090     Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.007 9.007 







df = 46 r(46) = .372 p < .01 
 
Ban Entities:                         8/19/2008 - 10/24/2008 
r = -0.712 
S&P Entities:                        8/19/2008 - 10/24/2008 
r = -0.970 
Ban Entities:                           9/19/2008 - 10/8/2008 
r = -0.666 
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Table depicts descriptive statistics of regression variables in “Abnormal CDS Spreads” equation. 
 






Index 3.50 3.21 0.71 2.81 4.82 2.81 4.16 
SPX Index 1139.83 1199.61 139.29 876.77 1300.68 997.57 1257.98 
GOLDS 
Comdty 826.10 826.90 48.61 721.45 913.25 796.90 863.85 
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